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SPECIAL BOOK REVIEW
Kentucky Tort Law: Defamation
And the Right of Privacy
By DAVID A. ELDER
MICHIE COMPANY, Pp. 545, $50 (1983)
Kentucky Tort Law: Defamation and the Right of Privacy is
the first of a planned three-part treatise on Kentucky tort law by
Professor David A. Elder of Northern Kentucky University's Chase
College of Law. The second volume, Negligence and Related Mat-
ters, now in progress, will cover negligence, professional malprac-
tice, strict liability and products liability. The final volume, In-
ternational Torts and Related Matters, will include assault and
battery, false imprisonment, trespass to land, conversion, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, misrepresentation, business
torts and misuse of legal process.
Based on an examination of the first volume, Kentucky Tort
Law should be a valuable practice aid for Kentucky attorneys.
The treatise is comprehensive and well-organized, the writing style
is clear, and the material is presented in an orderly and logical
manner. In addition, the section headings are accurate and in-
formative, thereby allowing the reader to look up specific issues
quickly. The index and the table of cases are also useful for this
purpose.
The quality of Professor Elder's research is impressive. Vir-
tually every Kentucky case on defamation and privacy is either
cited or discussed. The leading federal decisions are also covered
along with significant cases from other states. As is customary in
works of this sort, the author concentrates on describing legal doc-
trines and generally avoids criticism or suggestions for reform. On
occasion, however, critical comments are unavoidable. One ex-
ample concerns the way libel and slander are treated
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differently.' In Kentucky, as in most other jurisdictions, a writ-
ten statement2 is actionable without proof of special damagess if
it is defamatory on its face. 4 In contrast, an oral statement is not
actionable without proof of special damages unless it falls within
one of the categories of slander per se.5 These include imputation
of one of the following: (1) a serious crime;6 (2) conduct affec-
ting one's fitness for office; trade, occupation or business;7 (3)
loathsome disease; 8 or (4) unchastity in a woman.9 Although the
method of publication may have some bearing on the extent of
the plaintiff's damages, it provides no rational basis for separate
rules with respect to liability. 10
Professor Elder is also critical of the treatment given in Ken-
tucky to written statements which are not defamatory on their
I See D. ELDER, KENTUCKY TORT LAW: DEFAMATION AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY §
1.06 at 35 (1983) (hereinafter referred to as KENTUCKY TORT LAW].
2 Defamatory material which is either written or printed is treated as "libel." See,
e.g., Bonham v. Dotson, 288 S.W. 297 (Ky. 1926) (letter); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn,
120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909) (advertisement); Evening Post Co. v. Hunter, 38 S.W. 487 (Ky.
1896) (newspaper). In addition, radio and television broadcasts are treated as libel in many
jurisdictions. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 112 at 753 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A (1977). But see KY. REV. STAT. § 411.061 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982)
(providing special rules for defamation actions involving radio and television).
3 Special damages involve a pecuniary loss or the loss of some substantial or material
advantage. The loss must flow directly from impaired reputation. Taylor v. Moseley, 186
S.W. 634, 636-37 (Ky. 1916).
4 A written statement that is defamatory on its face is called "libel per se." A writ-
ten statement not defamatory on its face is known as "libel per quod." KENTUCKY TORT
LAW, supra note 1, at § 1.08. See notes 11-14 infra and accompanying text.
5 See Courier-Journal Co. v. Noble, 65 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1933).
6 See Miller v. Woods, 338 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Ky. 1960) (poisoning mother); Jones
v. Grief, 131 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Ky. 1939) (theft); Deitchman v. Bowles, 179 S.W. 249,
250 (Ky. 1915) (robbery).
7 See Weinstein v. Rhorer, 42 S.W.2d 892, 894-95 (Ky. 1931) (statement impugn-
ing city attorney's fitness for office); Register Newspaper Co. v. Worten, 111 S.W. 693,
697 (Ky. 1908) (statement associating attorney with criminals). See also White v. Hanks,
225 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Ky. 1953) (alleged slander per se required an imputation of fraud,
deceit, or dishonesty on the part of a used car salesman).
8 See Conner v. Taylor, 26 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Ky. 1930); Sally v. Brown, 295 S.W.
890, 891 (Ky. 1927) (both cases characterize venereal diseases as infectious diseases likely
to exclude persons from society).
9 See Holman v. Plumlee, 267 S.W.221, 222 (Ky. 1924); Nicholson v. Rust, 52 S.W.
933, 934 (Ky. 1899).
10 See Baker v. Clark, 218 S.W. 280, 282-83 (Ky. 1920) (while noting the incon-
sistency, the Court considered the distinction too "well-rooted" in the law to question).
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face." At common law all libel, whether defamatory on its face
or not, was actionable without proof of special damages.12
However, in some American jurisdictions, statements which are
not defamatory on their face are called libel per quod 3 and
treated like slander. 14 Although the case law in Kentucky is
ambiguous,, Professor Elder argues that all libel should be ac-
tionable without proof of special damages.16
Volume one of Kentucky Tort Law is divided into three
chapters. The first is devoted to the traditional law of libel and
slander. Among the topics covered are the nature of a defamatory
communication, colloquium, the publication requirement, the
single publication rule, slander per se and special damages, libel
per se and libel per quod, absolute and qualified privileges,
punitive damages at common law, and the effect of retraction
statutes.
Chapter two deals with recent developments in the law of
defamation. The discussion begins with an analysis of the tradi-
tional fair comment privilege, concluding that fair comment
historically extended to expressions of opinion but not to erroneous
11 See KENTUCKY TORT LAW, supra note 1, § 1.08, at 110-15.
12 See Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quad, 79 HAv L. lEv. 733, 736-37
(1965-66); Henn, Libel-By-Extrinsic Fact, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 14, 22-23 (1961-62).
13 At common law, the plaintiff was required to set forth the extrinsic facts needed
for the reader to understand the statement's defamatory meaning in the "inducement"
portion of the complaint. In the "innuendo" portion of the complaint, the plaintiff was
required to explain and establish the defamatory meaning of the communication with
reference to these extrinsic facts. Ausness, Libel Per Quad in Florida, 23 U. FLA. L. REv.
51, 51 (1970).
14 See Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839, 848-49 (1960).
15 Compare Hill v. Evans, 258 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1953) (where defamatory newspaper
article was libel per quod, plaintiff could not recover without allegation and proof of special
damages); Towles v. Travelers Ins. Co., 137 S.W.2d 1110 (Ky. 1940) (where publication
of agency suspension was held to be libel per quod, court required proof of such special
damages as were directly and proximately caused); Sweeney & Co. v. Brown, 60 S.W.2d
381 (Ky. 1933) (where letter was characterized as libel per quod, court held such libel
was only actionable where special damages resulted) with E.W. Scripps Co. v.
Cholmondelay, 569 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (where newspaper article is defamatory
per se, no legal malice or special damages need be proven).
16 See KENTUCKY TORT LAw, supra note 1, § 1.08, at 113-15. Elder discusses the con-
fusion in the Kentucky decision on libel and slander per quod and outlines seven reasons
why the Kentucky Supreme Court should abandon the "per quod" special damage hur-
dle. Id.
1983-84]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
statements of fact. 17 The author then examines New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan18 and other decisions19 which have held that
public officials and public figures2° cannot recover damages in
libel actions, even in the presence of factual inaccuracies, unless
they prove the existence of actual malice on the part of the
defendant. 21
The remainder of this chapter is largely concerned with the
issues raised by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.2 In Gertz, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that ordinary negligence was
sufficient to support an action for defamation against a media
defendant if the plaintiff was not a public figure.23 There is also
a lengthy discussion of McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville
Times Co., 24 a recent decision in which the Kentucky Supreme
Court, in accordance with Gertz, adopted a negligence standard
and rejected the more rigorous "actual malice" standard. 5
Another question raised by Gertz is whether expressions of opi-
nion are absolutely privileged.2 According to the Restatement of
Torts, a defamatory communication in the form of an opinion is
actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed
defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.-7 An opinion bas-
ed on disclosed or assumed nondefamatory facts is absolutely
17 See KENTUCKY TORT LAW, supra note 1, at § 2.01 (A). The author relies on Cole
v. Commonwealth, 300 S.W. 907, 911 (Ky. 1927) for this conclusion.
18 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19 Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); St. Amant
v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
20 See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 154-55 for a discussion of the dif-
ferences between these two concepts.
21 The "actual malice" standard imposes liability where the defendant publishes a
statement with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
2 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
23 Id. at 347-48.
24 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 45 U.S. 975 (1982). McCall is also
discussed in Mobley, Kentucky Law Survey-Torts, 70 Ky. L.J. 527, 529-42 (1981-82).
2 623 S.W.2d at 886. Professor Elder notes that the adoption of a simple negligence
standard in McCall is consistent with that of the majority of state courts in the post-Gertz
era. See KENTUCKY TORT LAW, supra note 1, § 2.11 at 395.
26 See KENTUCKY TORT LAW, supra note 1, § 2.04.
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 566 (1977).
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privileged, no matter how unjustified, unreasonable, or derogatory
the opinion may be.28 Professor Elder notes29 that the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Haynes v. McConnell3 applied the Restate-
ment rule and held that an opinion based on disclosed true facts
was absolutely privileged.31
The author also considers whether truth remains an affirmative
defense after Gertz, or whether the plaintiff is now required to
prove that the defendant's statement was false. 32 According to
Professor Elder, the Restatement of Torts makes a persuasive argu-
ment for imposing the burden of proving negligence in the case
of a private figure on the plaintiff: "As a practical matter, in order
to meet the constitutional obligation of showing defendant's fault
as to truth or falsity, the plaintiff will necessarily find that he must
show the falsity of the defamatory communication."'' Professor
Elder observes that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Wilson
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.34 held that as "a matter of
federal First Amendment law, the burden must be placed on the
plaintiff to show falsity." 3 However, he also notes that the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court in McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville
Times Co.,36 declared that the adoption of a negligence standard
"did not imply any change in the basic common-law and statutory
rule [regarding defamation] as expressed and interpreted by this
court in the past."37
Finally, the author discusses whether the first amendment prin-
ciples embodied in New York Times and Gertz should apply to
non-media defendants.8 Although Chief Justice Burger suggested
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment c (1977).
2 See KENTUCKY TORT LAW, supra note 1, § 2.04, at 353.
30 642 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
31 Id. at 904.
32 See KENTUCKY TORT LAw, supra note 1, at § 2.06(B).
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment j (1977). Most commentators
have also taken this position. See, e.g., Collins & Drushal, The Reaction of the State Courts
to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 28 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 306, 339-42 (1978); Robert-
son, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
54 TEx. L. REv. 199, 246, 267 (1976).
34 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1981).
3 KENTUCKY TORT LAw, supra note 1, § 2.06(B) (quoting from 642 F.2d at 376).
36 623 S.W.2d at 882.
37 Id. at 886.
3 See KENTUCKY TORT LAw, supra note 1, at § 2.07, at 365-66.
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in Hutchinson v. Proxmire39 that the Court had not yet deter-
mined that the actual malice standard would apply where a non-
media defendant was involved, most of the cases decided since
New York Times have required that actual malice be proved when
the plaintiff is a public official or a public figure, regardless of
the status of the defendant. 40 Professor Elder believes that this
position is correct and will ultimately be upheld by the Supreme
Court.4'
The last chapter of volume one is concerned with the right
ofprivacy. Professor Elder traces the history of the privacy con-
cept from its seminal treatment in the Warren and Brandeis arti-
cle of 189042 to the incorporation of Dean Prosser's theories43 in-
to the Restatement of Torts.44 According to the Restatement,
there are four distinct types of invasion of privacy: (1) appropria-
tion of name or likeness; (2) intrusion upon seclusion; (3) public
disclosure of private facts; and (4) false light in the public eye.45
As Professor Elder points out, 46 the 1927 Kentucky case of Brents
v. Morgan47 was the first to impose liability for public disclosure
of private facts.48 Kentucky decisions have also recognized ac-
tions for appropriation of name or likeness49 and for intrusion
upon seclusion.50 However, apparently the Kentucky courts had
not specifically adopted the "false light" version of invasion of
privacy until 1981 when McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville
3 443 U.S. 111, 133 n.16 (1979).
40 See, e.g., Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 649 (3d Cir.) (defendant was consultant
for American Bar Association accreditation team), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980); Bussie
v. Larson, 501 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (M.D. La. 1980) (defendant was a member of Na-
tional Right to Work Committee); Woy v. Turner, 533 F. Supp. 102, 104 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(defendant was the owner of professional baseball team); Decarbalho v. da Silva, 414 A.2d
806, 813 (R.I. 1980) (defendant was a doctor).
41 See KENTUCKY TORT LAw, supra note 1, § 2.07, at 365-66.
42 Warren & Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
43 See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977).
45 Id.
46 See KENTUCKY TORT LAw, supra note 1, § 3.01, at 422.
47 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927).
48 Id. at 971. See also Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 148 S.W.2d 708, 709-10 (Ky.
1941) (examined doctrine of Brents and refused to reject it).
49 See Wheeler v. P. Sorensen Mfg. Co., 415 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Ky. 1967); Foster-
Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1909).
50 Pangallo v. Murphy, 243 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Ky. 1951); Rhodes v. Graham, 37
S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. 1931).
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Times Co.51 was decided. Moreover, the Kentucky Court in
McCall expressly relied on the Restatement's approach as the con-
ceptual framework for delineating the right of privacy in
Kentucky. 52 Thus, according to Professor Elder, Kentucky now
recognizes each of the four types of privacy tort as separate and
distinct causes of action.
The chapter on the right of privacy closes with a brief con-
sideration of first amendment issues.0 The author observes that
the United States Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill- held that
the false reports of matters of public interest were not actionable
unless the plaintiff was able to prove that the defendant publish-
ed the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard
of the truth.,5 This approach applies the actual malice standard
to an "involuntary" public figure, and is arguably inconsistent with
the Court's reasoning in the Gertz case.0 Thus, in Professor
Elder's opinion, the Court will eventually recognize this anoma-
ly and repudiate the Hill decision.57 So far, the Kentucky
Supreme Court has taken a conservative position, declaring in
McCall that it was required to follow Hill.8
In conclusion, Kentucky Tort Law provides a lucid, orderly
and thorough review of the law of defamation and privacy in Ken-
tucky. Professor Elder's treatise is a significant contribution to the
state's legal literature and will no doubt be extremely useful to
Kentucky attorneys.
Richard C. Ausness*
51 623 S.W.2d at 887. However, Professor Elder discusses a number of prior Ken-
tucky decisions that were consistent with the "false light" theory. See KENTUCKY TORT
LAw, supra note 1, at § 3.05 (citing Engleman v. Caldwell & Jones, 47 S.W.2d 971 (Ky.
1932); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (Ky. 1929); Foster-Milburn Co. v.
Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1909)).
52 See 623 S.W.2d at 887.
53 See KENTUCKY TORT LAW, supra note 1, § 3.09 at 454-59.
54 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
53 Id. at 387-88.
5 See Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 856 (D. Kan. 1977) (widely published
specialist in the field of adolescent medicine was deemed a public figure invoking the ac-
tual malice requirement of New York Times). The Supreme Court did not reach this issue
in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
57 KENTUCKY TORT LAw, supra note 1, § 3.09 at 458-59.
M 623 S.W.2d at 888.
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, University of Florida;
LL.M. 1973, Yale University.
1983-84]

